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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to analyse the role of banks in the transmission of 
monetary policy and business cycle. This paper attempts to look into the assets 
side as a monetary policy channel to influence economic activities. Changes 
in the monetary policy channel give an idea to regulate and strengthen the 
banking industry. The different views raise the following questions: how 
do changes in the monetary policy transmission affect commercial banks 
portfolio? If bank lending plays as a monetary policy channel, does it affect 
the other portfolios? Do the current regulations (such as capital requirement) 
affect the bank portfolio behaviour? Furthermore, Generalise Least Squares 
method was used to estimate the monetary changes toward commercial banks 
portfolio. Annual data was compiled from the year 1994 until 2004. The 
number of observations was based on the combination of time series and cross-
sectional data, which is known as pooled data. In addition, an unbalanced 
bank-level panel data set for commercial banks was used. Finally, our results 
found that there exists a bank-lending channel in the case of Malaysia. 
JEL Classification numbers: E51; E52; E58. 
Keywords: Transmission mechanism; monetary policy; lending channel; 
pooled data.
ABSTRAK
Objektif artikel ini untuk menganalisis peranan bank dalam transmisi dasar 
kewangan dan kitaran perniagaan. Kajian ini cuba melihat aset bank sebagai 
saluran dasar kewangan dalam mempengaruhi aktiviti ekonomi. Perubahan 
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saluran dasar kewangan ini memberikan idea untuk meregulasikan dan 
memperkukuhkan industri perbankan. Pandangan yang berbeza telah 
menghasilkan beberapa persoalan kajian seperti berikut: bagaimana 
perubahan dalam transmisi dasar kewangan mempengaruhi portfolio bank 
perdagangan? Jika pinjaman bank memainkan peranan dalam saluran 
dasar kewangan, adakah ia akan mempengaruhi portfolio lain? Adakah 
regulasi semasa (seperti keperluan modal) mempengaruhi gelagat portfolio 
bank? Selain itu, kaedah kuasa dua terkecil umum akan digunakan bagi 
menganggarkan perubahan kewangan terhadap portfolio bank perdagangan. 
Data tahunan digunakan dari tahun 1994 hingga 2004. Bilangan sampel 
yang digunakan adalah berdasarkan kombinasi data siri masa dan keratan 
rentas yang juga dikenali sebagai kumpulan data. Tambahan lagi, data panel 
tahap-bank perdagangan yang tidak seimbang akan digunakan. Akhir sekali, 
kajian ini telah membuktikan wujud saluran pinjaman bank bagi kes di 
Malaysia.
INTRODUCTION
There has been long determined and interest on the role of banks in 
the transmission of monetary policy and business cycle. For example, 
Keynes (1936) found that money plays an important role in economic 
growth. Furthermore, Gurley and Shaw (1995) began to redirect 
attention	 toward	 the	overall	 interaction	between	financial	 structure	
and	 real	activity,	 emphasising	financial	 intermediation,	particularly	
the	 role	 of	 financial	 intermediaries	 in	 the	 credit supply process as 
opposed to the money supply process. Several important papers that 
supported this idea were Kuh and Meyer (1963); Tobin and Dolde 
(1963); Brainard and Tobin (1963); Minsky (1975); Kindleberger (1978); 
and Tobin (1975).
However, Bernanke and Blinder (1988) produced another view that 
looked	into	the	assets	side	as	a	monetary	policy	channel	to	influence	
economic activities. For example, in a monetary contraction, bank 
reserves decrease because of reserve requirements and reduced 
deposits. Consequently, it may increase the short-term and long-
term interest rates and also reduce the supply of bank loans. If bank-
dependent borrowers are dominant, the reduction in loan supply 
would reduce the investments and thereby economic activity. 
Besides that, according to balance sheet channel Bernanke and Gertler 
(1989),	monetary	policy	can	affect	a	borrower’s	financial	position	or	
net	 worth,	 thereby	 influencing	 the	 costs	 of	 external	 finance	 to	 the	
borrower (arising from the loss of creditworthiness). For example, an w
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increase in the bank’s interest rate would consequently decrease the 
borrowers’ investment and spending plan. 
However, the recent study made by Altunbas, Fazylov, and Molyneux 
(2002) found that across the EMU systems, undercapitalised banks 
(of any size) tend to respond more to change in policy. Furthermore, 
Huang (2003) analysed the cross-section differences between bank-
dependent and non-bank-dependent listed companies, and between 
listed and non-listed companies. Their results concluded that small 
firms	bear	most	 of	 the	 reductions	 in	bank	 loan	 supplies,	 and	 since	
they	do	not	have	many	alternatives	to	bank	finance,	they	suffer	more	
from	monetary	tightening	than	big	firms.	Furthermore,	he	found	that	
big,	non-bank-dependent	firms	can	benefit	more	from	the	bank-firm	
relationship	than	small,	bank-dependent	firms.	
Changes in the monetary policy channel give an idea on how to 
regulate and strengthen the banking industry. Thus, several questions 
can be highlighted: how do changes in the monetary policy tools 
affect the bank portfolio? If the bank lending plays as a monetary 
policy channel, do they affect the other portfolios? Do the current 
regulations (such as capital requirement) affect the bank portfolio 
behaviour? Thus, we hope this paper could contribute to the policy 
makers for making a good policy in order to stabilise the economy 
condition as well as the banking industry. 
Therefore, the objective of this paper was to analyse the bank lending 
channel as one of the important transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. We also want to examine whether deregulation can produce 
a counteract affect on the bank supply of loans (assets side). Besides 
this, we also want to prove whether bank portfolio can be affected 
by the monetary policy and current regulations (such as capital 
requirement).
The organisation of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
stylized facts about monetary policy in Malaysia. Section 3 gives an 
overview of the Malaysian banking industry. In section 4, it indicates 
recent literature on monetary transmission and bank lending. In 
section 5, we develop our methodology. In section 6 we present our 
empirical results and ultimately, section 7 concludes. 
STYLIZED FACTS ABOUT MONETARY POLICY IN MALAYSIA
Prior to the mid-1990s, monetary strategy in Malaysia was targeting 
monetary aggregates. This was an internal strategy and not formally w
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announced to the public. The establishment of this strategy was 
based on the evidence that monetary aggregates were closely linked 
to the ultimate objectives of monetary policy. This was proven by 
the correlation test, that is, monetary growth (M3) was shown to be 
positively	 and	 highly	 correlated	 with	 inflation	 by	 using	 quarterly	
data from 1980 to 1992. The ultimate objective of monetary policy is 
to stabilise price and it is seen as a suitable target for policy. Prior to 
1987, M1 was the main policy target. However, Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM) eventually placed greater importance on the broad monetary 
aggregate	M3	as	the	policy	target	because	of		financial	liberalisation	
and innovation. 
However,	 further	 developments	 in	 the	 economy	 and	 the	 financial	
system during the early 1990s had weakened this relationship and 
highlighted the problems associated with using monetary aggregates 
as	policy	 targets.	There	had	been	 large	 capital	 inflows	 in	 1992	 and	
1993 brought about the instability of the monetary aggregates as 
targets. The annual growth of money supply, as measured by M3 was 
extremely	volatile	during	the	period	of	large	capital	flows.	
Consequently, BNM had shifted the monetary policy strategy from 
monetary aggregates to interest rates as the intermediate target. There 
were	four	main	factors	that	influenced	the	changes	of	the	monetary	
policy. Firstly, the liberalisation of interest rates since 1978 led to a 
more market-oriented interest rate determination process. Secondly, 
financial	deregulation	and	liberalisation	measures	undertaken	during	
the decade had enhanced the role of the interest rate in the monetary 
transmission mechanism. Thirdly, there was a notable shift in the 
financing	 pattern	 of	 the	 economy	 since	 the	 mid-1980s	 following	
structural changes in the economy from an interest-inelastic market 
(Government securities market) to a more interest-sensitive market 
(bank credit and capital market). Ultimately, BNM also concentrated 
on the view that needed stability of interest rate in order to promote 
a	 stable	 financial	 system	 which	 would	 contribute	 toward	 a	 more	
effective transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Given this 
economic environment, investors became increasingly more interest 
sensitive. 
In this monetary policy strategy, we could see the evolution of interest 
rate regime from 1990 until recently. Prior to 1991, the deposit and 
lending rates were subjected to the administrative control of BNM. 
However, in February 1991 the policy had changed, where banking 
institutions were free to determine deposit and lending rates. In this 
policy, BNM had developed a standardised BLR formula based on an 
individual institution’s cost of funds. Besides this, the margin above w
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BLR was capped at 4 percentage points. Furthermore, in November 
1995, there was another change in the interest rate regime, which 
was a developed market-based BLR framework incorporating a 
standardised formula for the computation of maximum BLR for the 
banking industry. The maximum BLR was computed based on a 
weighted average of three-month interbank rate and administrative 
margin of 2.5 percentage points. However, the maximum margin 
above BLR remained at 4 percentage points. In September 1998, 
BNM had substituted the interbank rate with BNM intervention 
rate. Administrative margin was reduced to 2.25 percentage points. 
However, the maximum margin above BLR was lowered to 2.5 
percentage points. The intervention rate was used as a basis to 
compute the ceiling BLR, as it is the market rate at which banking 
institutions can borrow from BNM at times when the market is short 
of liquidity. Ultimately, on 26 April 2004, BNM implemented a new 
interest rate framework. Under this new framework, the overnight 
policy rate (OPR) replaced the three-month intervention rate. The 
OPR was set at the prevailing interbank overnight rate of 2.7% and 
allowed	to	fluctuate	within	a	narrow	range	of	plus	or	minus	25	basis	
points.	Banking	 institutions	could	 then	fix	 their	cost	structures	and	
business strategies. 
Furthermore, another characteristic of the monetary policy was 
the transition towards more market-based policy procedures. This 
strategy tried to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy in 
the medium to long run. BNM had accomplished a three pronged 
strategy to facilitate this transition process, which are enhancing 
transparency, improving the payment and settlement arrangements, 
and accelerating regulatory and prudential reforms.  
During	 the	 financial	 crisis	 in	 mid-1997,	 there	 had	 been	 adverse	
effects	 on	 financial	 and	 economic	 activities.	 Within	 that	 period,	
there	was	extreme	volatility	in	the	financial	markets.	The	well	built	
initial conditions and the prompt response and pragmatic measures 
introduced allowed Malaysia to avoid the extreme effects of the crisis. 
Policy had been given priority in order to ensure that the payment 
system and the intermediation function continued to operate 
efficiently	and	without	interruption.	
However, the policy responses to the crisis evolved with the different 
stages	of	the	financial	crisis	as	circumstances	changed.	Since	the	crisis	
became more long lasting and faced with severe economic contraction 
on 1 September 1998, BNM took the pre-emptive step to introduce 
selective exchange controls to contain the internalisation of the ringgit 
and	 to	 stabilise	 short-term	 capital	 flows.	 On	 16	 September,	 BNM	w
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reduced the SRR to 4%. Furthermore, BNM also made a reduction 
on the intervention rate in three successive steps to 7% per annum 
in November, which continued until August 1999 where the policy 
rate was reduced to 5.5% per annum. As a result of the aggressive 
easing monetary policy, the average BLR of commercial banks and 
finance	companies	fell	from	11.7%	and	14.7%	per	annum	respectively	
in August 1998 to as low as 6.79% and 7.95% per annum by August 
1999. 
Subsequently, the rapid easing of monetary policy following the 
introduction of the exchange control measures has been the best 
action to provide an environment of low interest rates and ample 
liquidity to support the economic recovery. This monetary policy 
change was imperative since more and more instruments in the global 
economy were market-based. The monetary policy framework would 
be adapted accordingly to ensure that monetary policy remains an 
effective policy to promote economic growth and monetary stability. 
The	Malaysian	financial	markets	are	regulated	and	under	the	control	
of	 BNM.	 In	 the	 late	 1990s,	 the	 financial	 sector	 had	 undergone	 a	
restructuring and consolidation exercise to strengthen the banking 
sector shock experienced substantial loss from huge non-performing 
loans. In 2001, BNM announced a 10-year plan for strengthening the 
financial	sector	that	limits	competition	from	new	foreign	banks	until	
after 2007 in order to protect the domestic banks. Overall, foreign 
participation in ommercial banking is limited to 30% of equity in any 
single institution. 
THE MALAYSIAN BANKING INDUSTRY
There had been many changes in banking performance since the Asian 
crisis; the Malaysian banking sector faced the disruption of liquidity, 
capital and performance. Many banks were merged and acquired in 
order to recover their losses incurred during the crisis. However in 
recent years, the Malaysian bank exists in three types of institutions: 
commercial	 banks,	 finance	 companies,	 and	 merchant	 banks.	
Domestic commercial banks have the largest share in the market. The 
government has implemented many restrictions for foreign banks 
operating	 in	Malaysia	 to	 develop	 in	 the	 domestic	 financial	 sector.	
The restrictions have decreased the hold of foreign commercial banks 
bank assets. This can be shown by the reduction of  share held by 
foreign commercial banks in 1957 (over 90% of banking system) that w
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decreased in 1997, only 16.7% of bank assets.  Besides this, since 1971, 
foreign banks have been prohibited to open new branches and the last 
license was given in 1973. 
The	evolution	of	financial	 intermediation	 in	Malaysia	 from	1960	 to	
2000	reflected	in	Table	1	shows	major	financial	intermediary	assets	by	
value and also by percentage. The traditional banking has recorded 
percentage	 increase	 in	 its	financial	assets	 for	 the	period	1960,	1970,	
and 1980, which accounted for 65.9%, 64.1% and 73.2% respectively. 
However, the period 1990 shows a decline to 69.7% and this is 
followed by further decline in 2000 to 66.9%. On the other hand, the 
assets of the non-bank institutions revealed the contrary. For the year 
1960, 1970, and 1980, the assets showed a declining trend from 33.5% 
to	33.3%,	and	finally	to	26.7%	respectively.
However, in the year 1990 and 2000, the assets record rising trend 
of 30.2% and 33.05% respectively. These developments witnessed 
the moving of funds from the traditional banking to non-banking 
financial	institutions.	It	seems	that	banking	experienced	contraction	
as evidenced in Table 1. This is also supported by a decrease of 
commercial bank assets as a fraction of total intermediated assets 
from 43.39% in 1980 to 41.08% in 2000.
Nevertheless, during the period 1990 to 2000, the traditional banking 
sector was exposed to the non-performing loans that stood very high, 
for instance at 9.1% for the periods of 1997 to 1999 (Source: Bank 
Negara	 Malaysia	 Annual	 Reports	 of	 1980-2000).	 Therefore,	 firstly,	
the so-called decline of commercial banking is limited to a decline in 
the relative importance of commercial banking because the banking 
industry assets actually increased between 1960 and 2000. In other 
words, bank assets have actually increased – just not as fast as the 
assets	of	other	financial	 intermediaries.	Secondly,	many	of	 the	new	
innovative	activities	in	which	banks	engage	in	are	not	reflected	on	the	
bank	balance	sheets	as	assets,	even	though	they	add	significantly	to	
bank revenue. These include, for example, trading in interest rate and 
currency swaps, selling derivative instruments, and issuing credit 
guarantees. Thirdly, banks have a strong comparative advantage 
in lending to individuals and small businesses. Credit guarantee 
schemes given by Credit Guarantee Corporation encourage banks 
to provide loans to small borrowers. Finally, banks have joined 
forces	with	a	number	of	other	types	of	financial	intermediaries.	The	
synonym	word	 of	 financial	 supermarket	 is	 very	much	 relevant	 in	
this case. For example, banks have combined with unit trust funds, w
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merchant	banks,	insurance	companies,	and	finance	companies.	Bank	
acquisitions	of	non-bank	financial	intermediaries	are	part	of	a	broader	
consolidation	of	the	entire	financial	service	industry.	
Similar	 to	 other	 financial	 intermediaries	 such	 as	 unit	 trust,	 leasing	
companies, factoring companies, and venture capital companies 
compared	 to	 the	 traditional	 finance,	 that	 financial	 intermediaries	
show their relative importance with rising trend after the year 1980. 
The	percentage	of	financial	assets	has	increased	from	the	lowest	1.75%	
in the 1980s to 6.87% in the year 2000. 
This evolution showed the emergence of various types of non-bank 
financial	institutions	and	the	increase	in	the	number	of	instruments	
introduced. It also indicates customer preferences on the various new 
types of instruments introduced or investment opportunities exist. 
For instance, the declining trends of commercial bank funds show 
customer preference toward investment in insurance or unit trust 
(Source: Money and Banking in Malaysia).
During the onset of crisis in the mid-1997, the Malaysian economy 
became	more	unstabilised	as	a	result	of	the	volatility	in	the	financial	
markets.	Capital	outflows	were	affected	by	the	short	 term	portfolio	
investment	prevailing	fluctuating	in	market	shares	by	the	decline	in	
equity values. Prior to the crisis, the economy strongly operated with 
an average annual real growth rate of 8.5 %. The banking sector was 
hit by the deteriotion, with non-performing loans increasing from 6% 
of the total loans at the end of 1997 to 22%  at the end of 1998, while 
provisioning as shares of non-performing loans declining from 66% 
to 42%. 
As the economy continued to deteriote in June to July 1998, two special 
agencies were established, which were Danaharta and Danamodal. 
Danaharta was established to handle buying non-performing loans at 
a discount in banks. Besides that, Danamodal was to inject new capital 
in selected institutions. Additionally, there was also the creation of the 
corporate debt restructuring committe (CDRC) in order to accelerate 
the pace of corporate debt restructuring in Malaysia. The establishment 
of the agencies would give an improvement and recovery of the non-
performing loans that was decreased to 15.3% of the total loans, while 
provisions rose to 53.8% of bad debt in year 2000. 
PRIOR STUDIES
The role of bank as a transmission of monetary policy can be seen from 
both assets and liabilities. Money channel tries to highlight an important w
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role of banks in order to generate liabilities. Banks expand their money 
through the deposits and placements earning from customers, banks, 
and	other	financial	 institutions.	 Ford,	Agung,	Ahmed,	 and	Santoso	
(2003) examined monetary contraction by increasing bank reserves 
owing to reserve requirement and had constrained the ability of banks 
to increase their deposits. Consequently, depositors hold less money 
(bank deposits) in their portfolios. 
The role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy emanates 
also from their assets. Loans are the main bank asset, where monetary 
policy	action	would	also	influence	the	loan	variable. The transmission 
of	monetary	policy	on	the	bank	lending	has	been	classified	into	two	
wide views, namely traditional money view, and credit view which 
affect the aggregate demand and thus the output. 
The	influence	of	monetary	shocks	on	real	economic	activity	has	two	
dimensions in the credit view, namely the borrower net worth channel 
(also known as the balance sheet channel) and the bank-lending 
channel. 
Firstly,	 a	 monetary	 shock	 can	 influence	 the	 financial	 position	 of	
a	 borrower	 firm.	A	 high	 net	 worth	 firm’s	 balance	 sheet	 makes	 its	
external	financing	from	the	loan	market	possible	and	hence,	stimulates	
investment decisions. As the transmission of monetary shocks to the 
real economy occurs through the borrower’s balance sheets, this 
channel is called the balance sheet channel (loan demand). Secondly, 
monetary	 shock	 can	 also	 influence	 the	 bank’s	 loan	 supply	 to	 bank	
dependent	firms.	This	change	 in	the	availability	of	 loans	 influences	
the	 investment	 decisions	 of	 the	 borrower	 firms	 by	 reducing	 the	
external	source	of	finance.	The	transmission	through	such	a	channel	is	
called the bank-lending channel (loan supply). However our research 
will only concentrate on the bank-lending channel as a mechanism 
transmission in monetary policy. 
The approach to the monetary transmission mechanism appears to 
be an important channel of credit view as there are bank dependent 
borrowers	who	have	 few	or	no	alternative	sources	of	finance	other	
than bank loans. Any frictions in the asset-liability management of 
banks due to monetary shocks would be transmitted to real economic 
activity through bank dependent producers in the economy. A tight 
monetary policy drains reserves from the banking system and restrict 
the	supply	of	loanable	funds	so	that	it	increases	the	external	finance	
premium	of	bank	dependent	borrower	firms.	w
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In other words, in this channel, Kishen and Opiela (2000) concluded 
that asymmetric information and time deposit purchasers expose 
these purchasers to the default risk through the non-reservable, 
uninsured deposits, i.e. time deposits. Consequently, an increase in 
reserve requirement by central banks may cause some banks unable 
to completely offset an increasing withdrawal in time deposits by 
depositors. This implies that open market operations can directly 
affect loan supply and create an additional channel of monetary 
transmission. 
The	effect	of	a	monetary	shock	on	 the	external	finance	premium	of	
small	size	firms	is	assumed	to	be	higher	than	large	size	firms,	under	
the	assumptions	that	large	size	firms	have	easier	access	to	the	credit	
markets	 and	 have	 more	 alternative	 sources	 of	 finance.	 Kakes	 and	
Sturm (2002) used quarterly data of six different banking groups in 
Germany. They concluded that lending by the credit co-operatives, 
which are on average the smallest banks declining most, whereas 
big banks are able to shield their loans portfolio against monetary 
shocks. This shows that the response of bank lending after a monetary 
contraction is very different across banking sectors. 
Besides that, Kashyap and Stein (1995; 2000) analysed disaggregated 
data of banks and found that large banks are better able to neutralise 
monetary shocks than small banks. Small banks face more credit 
market imperfections and have only limited access to alternative 
sources	of	finance,	hence	they	cannot	absorb	monetary	shocks	as	easy	
as larger banks. 
The presence of an active bank-lending channel may serve to explain 
the	amplified	and	propagated	conventional	effects	of	policy	shocks.	
It has been noted that since bank-lending channel focuses only on the 
lending behaviour of banks affected by monetary policy shocks, this 
transmission channel view is assumed to be a narrow typed credit 
channel approach. Kashyap and Stein (1995) use micro data on bank 
balance sheet to identify effects of monetary policy on bank lending. 
They divided banks into size categories and looked at the response of 
lending	to	monetary	policy	shocks,	which	they	identified	as	changes	
in the federal funds rate. They found that bank lending declines 
after a monetary policy contraction at all but the largest banks. They 
interpreted this as an evidence supporting the existence of a bank-
lending channel since one of the links in the chain of causality behind 
the bank-lending channel is that after a monetary contraction, a bank 
lends less. Similarly, the research made by Huang (2003) also revealed 
similar results using a UK balance sheet panel data.w
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However, their result is consistent with a fall in credit demand of small 
bank borrowers relative to large bank borrowers, which is consistent 
with the Oliner and Rudebusch (1995), but with criticism of Kashyap, 
Stein, and Wilcox (1993). Kashyap and Stein (1995) did not look at 
the next step in the chain of causality to see whether the differential 
response of small and large banks to monetary shocks has effect on 
the real economy and they found that a bank-lending channel exists 
for small balance constrained banks.
However other researchers have studied the effects of the monetary 
transmission on bank size and their behaviour towards lending. In 
addition, these studies also investigated whether monetary policy has 
a differential impact for banks of different asset size (Kayshap & Stein, 
1995), asset size and liquidity (Kayshap & Stein, 1997a) and asset size, 
and capital strength (Kishan & Opiela, 2000). These studies found that 
a bank-lending channel exists and this is mainly transmitted through 
small banks, which means that the bank-lending channel appears to 
be strengthened when small banks are either relatively illiquid or 
undercapitalised.
In short, the evidence strongly suggests that a bank-lending channel 
is present for small balance sheet constrained banks. The use of bank 
size as a measure to generate cross-sectional differences does not 
correspond precisely to the underlying theoretical models, which 
stressed the importance of net worth. In this context, bank capital may 
be a better proxy. Favero et al (1999) and Kishen and Opiela (2000) 
categorised banks by size into six asset size categories and further 
subdivided them into three capital strength groups. 
Though	regulators	use	a	variety	of	definitions	of	bank	capital,	 they	
focus on the equity capital ratio to total asset ratio (Benston, 1998, 
Estrella et al. 1999). This includes bank with equity to asset ratios with: 
< 5% (undercapitalised), > 5% and <10% (adequately capitalised), and 
> 10% (well/over capitalised). 
For	 the	 asset	 size	 of	 each	 bank,	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 inverse	
relationship between bank lending and changes in money market 
rates for undercapitalised small, medium, and large banks across 
11 EMU countries. The case of small and large bank relationship 
is contemporaneous, whereas for medium sized banks there is a 
significant	lagged	relationship	as	they	probably	are	better	insulated	
from monetary policy shock. It seems that bank-lending channel is 
more prevalent for undercapitalised banks operating in the other 
smaller EMU countries. w
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As such evidences of a bank-lending channel in EMU countries are 
mainly transmitted through undercapitalised banks operating in 
smaller banking systems. They indeed found that lending behaviour 
of small-undercapitalised US banks (those with less than RM300 
million in assets) were most responsive to monetary policy. Peek and 
Rosengren (1992) analysed the lending behaviour of New England 
banks over the 1990-1991 recession. Their results indicated that the 
loans of well-capitalised banks fell less than the loans of poorly 
capitalised banks. 
 
Hence,	 as	 with	 the	 Kashyap	 and	 Stein	 findings,	 their	 evidence	
suggested	there	are	effects	on	informational	imperfections	in	financial	
markets on the balance sheets of intermediaries as well as borrowers. 
Debondt	(1998)	was	the	first	to	use	disaggregated	bank	data	to	test	for	
evidence of the lending channel across various European countries, 
following a similar approach to Kashyap and Stein (1995, 1997a). 
Debondt (1998) also tested European banks with varying characteristics 
(in terms of balance sheet size and liquidity) responding to the changes 
in the stance of monetary policy (short term interest rates) during the 
1990-1995 periods in order to examine whether there exist important 
differences. In his interactive regression models, he used changes in 
money market rates (as a proxy for monetary policy stance). Overall, 
the evidence showed there exists bank-lending channel in Germany, 
Belgium, and  Netherlands, while the rest of countries under study 
(France,	 Italy,	 and	 United	 Kingdom)	 no	 significant	 effects	 were	
found. However, when the stance of monetary policy is measured by 
a monetary condition index, the bank-lending channel also appeared 
to exist in Italy and France. 
In 1999, he adopted a different approach by using aggregate bank 
data to examine the main lending channel in the same six European 
countries. By including security holdings in a vector error correction 
model as a variable used to detect loan supply effects, he found 
evidence that credit constraints due to monetary policy were important 
in Italy, Germany, and France, but not in United Kingdom, Belgium, 
and Netherlands. 
Furthermore, Altunbas et al. (2002) by using panel data approach, 
found that EMU systems, undercapitalised banks (of any size) seem 
to respond more to change in policy. It seemed that the bank-lending 
channel is more prevalent for undercapitalised banks. However, 
Favero (1999) used individual bank balance sheet data to investigate 
the response of banks in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain to monetary w
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tightening in 1992. They found no evidence of bank-lending channel 
although	 they	 did	 find	 that	 banks	 in	 different	 countries	 respond	
in different ways to protect the supply of loans from the liquidity 
squeeze. 
In other perspectives, bank lending is also exposed to GDP shocks. 
This is because demand for loans is pro-cyclical. However, bank 
lending supply could behave differently according to the business 
cycle. According to Boot (2000) and Thakor (2004) the reason is that 
banks deeply involved in relationship lending are likely to smooth 
lending through the cycle. Although, well-capitalised banks could 
be	 in	a	better	position	 to	absorb	 temporary	financial	difficulties	on	
the part of their borrowers. Besides that, much previous literature 
had emphasised on the relationship between bank capital and risk 
aversion (Rochet, 1992). This meant, that if banks choose ex ante a loan 
portfolio with higher return and risk, their borrowers are on average, 
more	financially	fragile	and	more	exposed	to	economic	downturns.	
These could highly debate an important issue of how bank capital 
influences	the	response	of	bank	lending	to	monetary	policy	and	GDP	
shocks. 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) found that well-capitalised banks are 
less constrained by capital requirements and have more opportunities 
to expand their loan portfolio. Furthermore, the results showed that 
the response of bank lending to a monetary policy has the expected 
negative	sign.	The	findings	also	showed	that	the	effects	of	monetary	
tightening are smaller for banks with higher capital ratios, which have 
easier	access	to	uninsured	financing.	Their	findings	also	showed	that	
there is positive correlation between credit and output. An increase 
in output causes a loan increase. The interaction term between GDP 
and excess capital is negative. This means that the credit supply of 
well-capitalised banks is less dependent on the business cycle. This is 
consistent with Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997), where capital is found to 
have	a	significantly	negative	effect	on	credit	risk.	
METHODOLOGY
The Model
In this section, we adopted an approach similar to Kashyap and Stein 
(1995), and Kishen and Opiela (2000). Though, we tried to examine 
evidence of the bank-lending channel in Malaysia. In particular, we 
examined evidence of the lending channel for the commercial banks w
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in Malaysia between 1994 and 2004. 
According to bank-lending channel theory, the central point in the 
issue of procyclical behaviour of banks is the passing through of 
lending into the macroeconomic sphere similar to that of Bernanke 
and	Blinder	(1992).	Therefore,	this	section	briefly	discusses	the	extent	
to which lending depends on either demand or supply variables. 
Naturally, there is a strong correlation between demand for credit and 
the business cycle. The model developed below is estimated using the 
random effects panel data approach. This was set out as follows, with 
index i referring to bank i and t to period t. Our empirical model for 
lending was given as: 
Lendingit = α1 gdpit + α2 unemploymentit + α3 M3it + α4 interbank 
rateit + α5	profitsit + α6 non-depositit + α7 capital and reservesit + α8 
securitiesit + α9treasurybills + μt
The explanation of the above variables is as follows: 
Macroeconomic Factors
(i)  Real GDP growth. The	GDP	growth	figure	is	the	most	general	
and most direct measure of macroeconomic development. In 
our	context,	it	is	first	and	foremost	an	indicator	of	the	demand	
for banking services, including the extension of loans, and 
the supply of funds, such as deposits, and as such is a direct 
determinant	of	profits.	As	a	growth	figure,	it	is	the	single	most	
useful indicator of the business cycle, while the costs of banks 
are also expected to be linked to the economic cycle. The GDP 
growth	figure	is	made	real	by	deflating	it	with	inflation.	
(ii)  Unemployment (%). Unemployment	does	not	directly	influence	
profitability,	 but	 it	 is	 a	major	 cyclical	 indicator.	 If	 short-term	
unemployment	 is	primarily	a	reflection	of	the	business	cycle,	
long-term unemployment indicates structural disequilibrium 
in the economy. In addition, unemployment is a measure of 
the current phase in the business cycle, whereas GDP growth 
merely indicates the degree of change in the business cycle. 
(iii)  Real money supply (M3; % change). The money supply is 
represented	by	the	monetary	aggregate	M3,	defined	as	the	sum	
of cash and non-cash balances held by the public, short-term 
deposits, foreign-exchange holdings, and short-term savings. 
Growth of the money supply makes real growth possible, and 
is primarily an indicator of future growth potential (Boeschoten w
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et al.,	1994;	Berk	&	Bikker,	1995).	In	the	first	place,	it	reflects	the	
availability of money, which is strongly linked to the creation 
of money by banks through lending. Excessive money growth 
implies a risk of overheating the economy and its concomitant 
rising	inflation.	The	European	Central	Bank	therefore	regards	
excessive	 M3	 growth	 as	 a	 preamble	 to	 rising	 inflation.	 The	
impact	 of	money	 supply	on	profits	 is	mostly	 indirect,	which	
is why this variable, too, functions mostly as a control variable. 
Like	real	GDP,	the	real	money	supply	is	deflated	by	GDP	price	
increase. 
(iv)  Interbank rate. The three-month KLIBOR is determined by 
the	 supply	 and	demand	 of	 funds	 by	 financial	 institutions	 in	
the interbank market, the largest lender being Bank Negara 
Malaysia.	 The	 central	 bank	 can	 influence	 the	 interbank	 rates	
through its open market operations by borrowing from and 
lending	 to	 the	financial	 institutions.	According	 to	Affin-OUB	
Research,	 the	 drop	 in	 the	 three-month	 KLIBOR	 reflects	 a	
change in the central bank’s open market operation and does 
not signal a change in monetary policy or an impending spike 
in the statutory reserve requirement (SRR) of banks. In a recent 
report, the research house said now that the three-month 
KLIBOR	is	more	market-determined	than	before,	the	financial	
instrument is expected to display a greater degree of volatility. 
A head of research from a stockbroker said BNM, by making 
a shift from the three-month KLIBOR to the shorter-end one-
month KLIBOR, hopes to encourage banks to lend more 
among themselves, indirectly boosting loan growth which has 
stagnated	because	banks	are	unable	to	find	good	borrowers.	
Banking Sector Specific Factors
(i)  Loans (as a share of total assets). This variable represents the 
(relative) size of lending. Generally, loans have a positive 
influence	 on	 profitability,	 because	 as	 a	 bank’s	 core	 business,	
they are a major generator of interest income, but lending also 
entails operational costs and credit losses. If costs and risks are 
not expressed adequately in the price of credit (i.e. the mark-up 
rate), as a result of cross subsidisation, then lending becomes 
a loss-making business. In any case, this variable serves to 
characterise a bank’s balance sheet. Like the variables that 
follow below, the loans variable is divided by total assets in 
order to standardise it and allow comparisons across countries 
and years. w
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(ii)  Capital and reserves (as a share of total liabilities and 
shareholder’s funds). This includes paid-up capital, reserved 
funds,	 retained	 profits	 and	 other	 capital	 funds.	 Capital	 and	
reserves constitute the own funds or core capital of a bank and 
it also could measure solvency of a bank. If investment is risky, 
the more capital is needed to shield any negative possibility 
from the investment. While high-risk investments bring in 
more returns, greater capital could go together with high 
profits,	so	that	a	positive	coefficient	may	be	expected	as	well,	
depending	on	the	degree	to	which	risk	pays	off.	If	profits	are	
defined	as	returns on equity, then a relatively small capital may 
leverage	high	profits,	and	one	should	expect	to	see	a	negative	
coefficient.	If	profits	are	defined	as	the	margin	on	assets,	capital	
and reserves become a free	source	of	finance,	so	that	from	this	
perspective,	 one	must	 expect	 a	 positive	 coefficient.	 Thus,	 on	
account of the many possible ways they may pass through 
to the results, the capital and reserves variable is primarily a 
control variable. 
(iii)  Non-bank deposits (as a share of balance sheet total). Non-bank 
deposits include all deposit liabilities of banks except interbank 
deposits. This variable characterises the funding structure of 
the banking system. 
(iv)  Securities (securities purchased under resale agreement). 
Securities include foreign government bonds and foreign 
government treasury bills. 
Estimation Methods
To verify whether the sample data is normally distributed, the data 
was tested using several techniques such as the skewness test, kurtosis, 
the Jarque Bera as well as the value of mean and median. If a sample is 
normally distributed, the value of skewness will be equal to zero, the 
value of kurtosis should be three and the value of mean should be the 
same as the value of its median while the value of Jarque Bera should 
not	be	significant	or	with	high	value	of	probability.	A	sample	data	that	
is	 normally	 distributed	 should	 be	 an	 efficient	 estimator,	 unbiased,	
and consistent. If the sample data is not normally distributed, i.e. the 
value of mean and median for all the variables are not the same while 
their skewness is not equal to zero, the value of kurtosis are not equal 
to	three,	and	the	values	of	Jarque-Bera	are	significant,	therefore	it	can	
be concluded that based on the above, the Ordinary Least Squares 
estimation method is not a better estimation method to be used. w
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Hence, the Generalise Least Square method is more appropriate and 
expected to yield a much better result. 
The	 standard	 unit	 root	 test	 has	 to	 be	 performed	 first	 to	 check	 the	
stationarity of our data. However, it is often argued that the commonly 
used unit root tests, such as the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and 
the Phillips-Perron test, are not very powerful. As a response, panel 
unit root tests were developed. These tests are in essence motivated to 
increase the power through pooling information across units. 
In order to adopt the appropriate panel estimator, Hausman test 
statistic	was	used	 to	 compare	 random	effects	with	 the	fixed	effects	
model.	In	all	the	estimations	outlined	in	our	paper,	the	fixed	affects	
was the preferred model. 
Data
To estimate equation (1), we use an unbalanced bank-level panel data 
set for 25 commercial banks. The data are annual and span the period 
from 1994 to 2004. The total number of observations in the sample is 
275. Before we can estimate the equation, the number of degrees of 
freedom (df) should be taken into account.
 
In this manner, a full cycle 
of the Malaysian economy is included, a point of particular importance 
given that the aim of this paper is, as mentioned, to analyse whether 
there is a relationship between the business cycle, lending, monetary 
policy, and regulatory framework (capital requirement).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our	 first	 step	 of	 estimation	 is	 to	 test	 the	 unit	 root	 test	 for	 each	
pool data. From the equation we developed, there are 10 variables 
to be estimated. Below are the results for the stationary test. From 
the	 unit	 root	 test,	 we	 specified	 them	 into	 individual	 process	 and	
common process, in which the common test indicates that the tests 
are estimated assuming a common AR structure for all the series, 
while the individual test is used for tests which allow for different AR 
coefficients	in	each	series.	
The probability values are in the parenthesis, while others are 
t statistics. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an 
asympotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. w
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Table 2
Stationary Test (Level) 
Individual unit root process 
C
om
m
on unit root process 
Variables 
Im
, Pesaran and Shin W
-stat 
A
D
F - Fisher C
hi-square 
PP - Fisher C
hi-square 
Levin, Lin &
 C
hu t* 
Breitung t-stat 
Loan 
-0.15896 
(0.4368) 
42.8491 
(0.2709) 
67.4344 
(0.0043)* 
-6.88764 
(0.0000)* 
-1.23514 (0.1084) 
N
-D
eposit 
-0.84638 
(0.1987) 
56.3843 
(0.0278)*** 
103.744 
(0.0000)* 
-10.8525 
(0.0000)* 
-2.3305 
(0.0099)* 
Share C
apital &
 R
eserves 
-0.13824 
(0.445) 
63.7551 
(0.0635)*** 
60.2594 
(0.1103) 
-8.25881 
(0.0000)* 
-2.71226 
(0.0033)* 
P
rofi
t 
-0.67399 
(0.2502) 
43.1575 
(0.0900)*** 
122.45 
(0.0000)* 
-12.8157 
(0.0000)* 
-1.65814 
(0.0486)** 
Securities 
0.53754 
(0.7046) 
28.7856 
(0.63) 
16.1823 
(0.9909) 
-4.15524 
(0.0000)* 
-0.85473 
(0.1963) 
G
D
P 
-1.65016 
(0.0495) 
95.3707 
(0.0001)* 
136.625 
(0.0000)* 
-18.7977 
(0.0000)* 
-0.62311 
(0.2666) 
U
nem
ploym
ent
-0.45496 
(0.3246) 
62.559 
(0.1095) 
152.1 
(0.0000)* 
-13.6948 
(0.0000)* 
4.84201 
(1.0000) 
M
3 
-0.00205 
(0.4992) 
43.075 
(0.7453) 
22.674 
(0.9997) 
-0.25708 
(0.3986) 
7.51002 
(1.0000) 
O
vernight 
0.29784 
(0.6171) 
37.5605 
(0.861) 
38.2819 
(0.841) 
-0.26215 
(0.3966) 
-0.65813 
(0.2552) 
3 M
onth 
-0.24002 
(0.4052) 
47.5375 
(0.5728) 
49.7164 
(0.4847) 
-4.33503 
(0.0000)* 
-1.27468 
(0.1012) 
Treasury Bills 
-2.81517 
(0.0024)* 
71.398 
(0.0251)** 
70.0656 
(0.032)** 
-6.16529 
(0.0000)* 
-1.09716 
(0.1363) 
N
ote:	*,**	and
	***	ind
icate	signifi
cance	at	the	1%
,	5%
,	and
	10%
	levels,	resp
ectively.	
The probability values are in the parenthesis, w
hile others are t statistics. Probabilities for Fisher tests are com
puted using an asym
potic 
Chi-square distribution. A
ll other tests assum
e asym
ptotic norm
ality. 
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According to Table 2, our results show that only several variables are 
significant	at	 level	 stage	 for	unit	 root	 test	 that	 is	 loan,	non-deposit,	
share	 capital	 and	 reserves,	 profit,	 securities,	 GDP,	 unemployment,	
three month interbank rate, and three month treasury bills. However, 
variables	that	are	not	significant	at	level	stage	will	be	dropped	from	
our next estimations, which are M3 and overnight interbank rate. This 
is	to	prevent	from	the	problems	of	mis-specification.	
Descriptive Analysis
Figure 1 shows the loan-deposit ratio of commercial banks in 
Malaysia.	The	figure	shows	 that	all	banks	were	mostly	at	 the	same	
ratio and only Malayan Banking Berhad in 2001 showed differently, 
which boosted up to 25.
Figure 1
Trend of loan-asset ratio by banks from 1994 to 2004w
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Figure 2 shows the three-month interbank rate from 1994 to 2004. 
Obviously, the rate increased from 1994 to 1997, however after 
economic crisis in 1997 the rate rapidly decreased to just over 3% in 
1999 and more or less than 3% until 2004. Solving of the economic crisis 
was the main reason behind the decline of three-month interbank rate 
in 1999. In addition, it could inculcate the supply of loans since the 
cost for borrowers were low.
Figure 2
Trend of three-month interbank rate
From	 the	descriptive	 analysis	 shown	 in	Table	 3,	we	 could	find	out	
the distribution of the samples data. From our analysis, we found 
that the mean and median value is not equal for each variable tested. 
Furthermore, the skewness value was mostly is not equal to zero, for 
example deposit and loan are 2.778081 and 2.512297 respectively. Also 
from our analysis, we found that the kurtosis value is also not equal 
to three. Most of the values are more or less than three. The most 
important thing in the analysis was we proved that all the probability 
values	are	significant.	Thus,	we	could	conclude	that	sample	of	the	data	w
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is not normally distributed. Therefore, the next estimation would be 
more appropriate by using Generalise Least Squares method instead 
of Ordinary Least Squares.
Table 4
The Responsive of Total Loan to Changes in Monetary  Policy. 
Generalise Least Squares (Fixed Effects) 
Dependent variables/Independent variables Loan
Deposit(1) 0.875317 (4.281491)* 
Share capital & reserves 0.005209 (0.094848) 
Profit	
1.513614 
(2.198545)** 
Securities 1.555317 (2.112524)** 
GDP(2) -0.000116 (-11.7566)* 
Unemployment (2) -554212.4 (-2.11936)** 
3-Month Interbank Rate -458321.8 (-1.90256)*** 
3-Month Treasury Bills 382713.8 (0.85825) 
Constant -1.19E+08 (-7.13838)* 
Trend 1375403 (8.200615)* 
Adjusted R-squared 0.949852 
F-statistic 122.738 
Note:	 *,**	 and	 ***	 indicate	 significance	 at	 the	 1%,	 5%	 and	 10%	 levels,	
respectively.	The	t-statistics	are	in	the	parenthesis,	while	others	are	coefficient	
values. 
Table 4 illustrates the responsiveness of total loans (LOAN) to changes 
in monetary policy across 25 commercial banks in Malaysia from 1994 
to 2004. It can be seen from the loan equation that bank lending does 
appear	 to	be	statistically	and	significantly	related	 to	 the	changes	 in	
the stance of the monetary policy. The changes in monetary policy 
proxy	 by	 three-month	 interbank	 rate	 significantly	 show	 the	 effect	
of changes in total loans. This revealed that, an increase of 1% in w
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interbank rate (monetary contraction) would result in  a total loan 
decrease by 458321.8%. This suggests how the changes in monetary 
stance would affect the supply of loans, which is consistent with the 
bank-lending channel. 
Additionally,	 the	 results	 also	 revealed	 that	 there	 is	 a	 significant	
positive relationship between total lending and deposits, securities, 
and	 profit,	 at	 coefficient	 values	 0.875317,	 1.555317,	 and	 1.513614,	
respectively. This would suggest that banks adjust their deposits 
during the monetary changes. An increase in deposits will more likely 
inculcate	the	supply	of	loans	to	customers.	Specifically,	deposit	is	an	
obligation of the banks and it has been used as one of the sources of 
funds to offer more loans to customers. Therefore, it seems to be that 
all banks have a buffer of liquid assets to offset the monetary shock.
Furthermore,	their	profits	also	increase	in	the	effect	of	the	monetary	
stance. However, the two remaining macro variables that are output 
(GDP)	and	unemployment	are	statistically	significantly	proven	at		a	
lag two years after the monetary policy. This would suggests that 
changes in monetary policy could affect the supply of loans in the 
current period, while it would reduced output after two years at 
coefficient	value	-0.000116.	
Nevertheless,	 the	 other	 variable	 is	 not	 significant	 including	 share	
capital	and	reserves,	that	proxy	as	capital	requirement.	This	finds	that	
the capital strength at any level cannot be proved by the changes of 
monetary policy. In other words, no matter how high capital ratio of 
banks, they do not get affected by the monetary shock from bank-
lending channel.
CONCLUSIONS
Following the approach suggested by Kashyap and Stein (1995), 
Kishen and Opiela (2000) the bank balance sheet was used to estimate 
the response of bank lending to changes in the monetary policy stance 
between 1994 and 2004. From the estimations it was found that there 
was evidence on the bank-lending channel in the case of Malaysia. 
This means that any changes in monetary policy, for example a change 
in the interbank rate, would affect supply of loans in the current year. 
This	 result	 can	directly	 answer	 the	first	 research	question	 that	was	
highlighted. 
 
In addition, the existence of a bank-lending channel shows that any 
changes in interest rate proxy by three-month interbank rate can w
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influence	loan	supply	and	it	would	affect	the	other	portfolios	such	as	
deposit,	profit,	and	securities	in	a	positive	relationship.	An	increase	
in these three variables would increase the supply of loans that can 
function as sources of funds. The monetary stance also affects the 
securities holding by banks in order to get a buffer of funds. These 
findings	show	that	it	was	successfully	proven	that	monetary	stance	
can give a positive effect to the bank portfolio.
Nevertheless, we had failed to prove the capital requirement as the 
component that maybe taken into account in order to prove whether 
bank	with	well	 capitalised	or	under	capitalised	would	 reflect	more	
the monetary policy shock. Therefore, it is concluded that the 
capital	 requirement	 in	Malaysia	 is	 not	 a	 factor	 that	may	 influence	
the	 performance	 of	 the	 bank	 lending,	 reflected	 by	 the	 changes	 of	
monetary policy. 
A policy implication that could be concluded from this paper is that 
there exists a bank-lending channel in the case of Malaysia. This 
means that our monetary policy could not only affect the liabilities 
side, but also the assets side. Thus, as policy makers, they can use the 
monetary policy in order to change the supply of loans to overcome 
the	 recession	 and	 inflation	 in	 the	 economy.	We	 could	 also	 keep	 in	
mind that monetary policy could not only be regulated by money as 
intermediation targets, but also as interest rates. 
END NOTE
The term number of degrees of freedom means the total number of 
observations in the sample (= n) less the number of independent 
(linear) constraints or restrictions put on them. In other words, for the 
k variable model it will have n – k df. The general rule is this: df = n 
– number of parameters estimated.
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